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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Automaticity of Attentional Bias to Threat in High and Low
Worriers
Huw Goodwin1 • Claire Eagleson1 • Andrew Mathews1,2 • Jenny Yiend1 •
Colette Hirsch1
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Individuals with high levels of worry are more
likely than others to attend to possible threats, although the
extent of top-down attentional control processes on this
bias is unknown. We compared the performance of high
(n = 26) and low worriers (n = 26) on a probe discrimi-
nation task designed to assess attention to threat cues,
under cognitive load or no-load conditions. The expected
difference between groups was confirmed, with high wor-
riers being more likely to attend to threat cues than low
worriers. Importantly however, there were no significant
effects involving condition (cognitive load vs. no-load),
nor any significant association with self-perceived atten-
tional control ability. These results suggest that patholog-
ical worriers are more likely to attend to threat than are
individuals with low levels of worry, regardless of task
demands on limited cognitive control resources. This
finding is consistent with the dominance of habitual bot-
tom-up influences over top-down control processes in
biased attention to threat.
Keywords Anxiety  Generalised anxiety disorder 
Worry  Attention  Cognitive bias  Cognitive load
Introduction
Worry is experienced by most people to varying degrees
(Borkovec 1994), but when excessive and uncontrollable,
represents a key criterion of generalised anxiety disorder
(GAD; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5th Edition;
DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association 2013). Given
the negative consequences of excessive worry, it is unclear
why worriers continue to focus on negative thoughts,
although some theories suggest that worry is a strategy for
avoiding more aversive emotions (Borkovec et al. 2004),
and that it is erroneously perceived as a helpful problem-
solving strategy (Wells 1995). Such theories imply that
worry is to some extent a voluntary process, involving
deliberate attention to threats.
Attention is governed by two systems: an involuntary
stimulus-driven (bottom-up) system that rapidly orients
attention to salient information (Yantis 2000); and a more
controlled goal-driven (top-down) system that modulates
habitual attentional capture and serves to shift and maintain
focus on task-relevant cues (Corbetta and Shulman 2002).
The two systems interact and operate alongside each other
to effectively focus and redirect attention so as to maintain
safety and follow personally-relevant goals. However,
some types of stimuli are particularly effective in capturing
attention even when this interferes with current task goals.
For example, threats often capture attention preferentially
over neutral information, presumably representing an
evolutionary adaptation to maintain survival (O¨hman
1986). Biased attention to threat cues is particularly pro-
nounced in anxious individuals (Yiend 2010) as demon-
strated in studies using variants of the attention probe task
(MacLeod et al. 1986). In these studies, anxious individuals
have been found to respond more quickly to neutral targets
in the same location as a threatening rather than a neutral
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cue (see Bar-Haim et al. 2007) implying an attentional bias
towards threat (Becker et al. 2001; Bradley et al. 1999;
Mathews and MacLeod 1985). Although anxiety and worry
are related, with worry being seen as a cognitive compo-
nent of anxiety; compared to studies focusing on anxiety,
less is known about the specific relationship between worry
and attention to threat.
Selective attention to threat has been postulated as a causal
factor in Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) cognitive model of
pathological worry. According to this model, worry results
from a combination of an automatic bottom-up bias with
impaired top-down control processes, leading to intrusive
negative thoughts. In support, Krebs et al. (2010) found that
enhancing an attentional bias to threat words increased neg-
ative thought intrusions in the general population. Hayes et al.
(2010) provided further support for this argument by
demonstrating that training high worriers to attend away from
threat led to a reduction in negative thought intrusions. In
Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model, worry is then further
maintained by an inability to voluntarily disengage from
negative thoughts once they have captured attention. Other
evidence suggests that worry itself can negatively impact
attentional control by taking up working memory capacity,
leaving fewer residual resources to shift attention to relevant
task cues (Hayes et al. 2008; Leigh and Hirsch 2011; Ste-
fanopoulou et al. 2014). The effect of worry in taking up
attentional resources can be viewed as akin to an internal
cognitive load, leading to a detriment in everyday task per-
formance. Furthermore, imposition of additional cognitive
load was found to have a greater deleterious effect on task
performance among anxious individuals than non-anxious
individuals (MacLeod and Donnellan 1993), presumably also
due to the pre-emption of control resources by worry
(Eysenck and Calvo 1992; Eysenck et al. 2007).
Although this evidence shows that both biased attention
and impaired attentional control are characteristic of high
worriers, it remains unclear whether or how they interact.
One possibility is that the tendency to attend to severe
threats is universal (O¨hman 1986), but high worriers are
less able to exert control over this tendency for milder
threats, so that persisting attention to mild threat is really a
consequence of poor control. Alternatively, even if atten-
tion to threat is typical of high but not low worriers,
ineffective control might still prevent high worriers from
countering the resulting bias (cf. Derryberry and Reed
2002). Both of these possibilities assume that high worriers
typically make efforts (albeit ineffective) to avoid attend-
ing to threats; however, it could be that some do not
attempt to exert such control, or instead focus their atten-
tion on threats in the belief that this is helpful (Wells 1995).
In summary, attentional bias to threat among individuals
experiencing high levels of worry is fairly well established.
Some cognitive theories (e.g. Hirsch and Mathews 2012)
suggest that attentional bias may be modulated by top-
down control processes, but there is no direct evidence that
control efforts are deployed so as to either reduce or aug-
ment attentional bias. The present study was designed to
provide such evidence by comparing attentional bias in
high and low worriers, with and without an additional
cognitive load. Manipulating available cognitive control
resources in this way allowed investigation of whether
control resources are normally deployed to reduce or
augment attention to threat, or neither. That is, if control
efforts are usually directed to countering attention to threat,
imposition of a load should enhance bias, whereas if usu-
ally directed to attending threat, bias should be reduced
under load. Alternatively, if control efforts are absent or
ineffective, load should have little or no effect. Because
threat bias has been found to be most apparent when
primed by worry (Williams et al. 2014), the test of attention
used here was preceded by a period of instructed worry.
Finally, because attentional control may differ in a trait-
like fashion across individuals, variations in self-reported
control were also assessed to determine if attention to
threat differed according to control ability (Derryberry and
Reed 2002). The hypotheses to be investigated can be
summarised as follows: (1) following worry, high worriers
will attend more to threat cues than low worriers; (2) if
control typically reduces or augments attention to threat,
additional cognitive load will increase or decrease the
assessed bias correspondingly, and (3) to the extent that
efforts to control attention are effective, observed bias
should vary according to self-reported control ability.
Methods
Design
After a brief period of instructed worry, both high and low
worry participants performed a well-established attention
probe task in which threat-neutral word pairs were displayed
for 500 ms, followed by a target in the location of one of the
words to be identified as rapidly as possible (MacLeod et al.
1986; for a review, see Yiend 2010). Selective attention to
threat can be inferred from relative speeding of responses to
targets replacing threat words. In the present study, this task
was divided into two trial blocks of 216 trials each, presented
in counterbalanced order, one without cognitive load and
one in which participants were required to hold new sets of
six digits in memory every 12 trials.
Participants
A total of 66 non-clinical participants were initially
recruited through online advertisements. To be included
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participants were aged between 18 and 60 years old, had
English as their first language and indicated that they either
worried a great deal or not much. They were first screened
using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer
et al. 1990) and those scoring either C56 (high worriers) or
B35 (low worriers) were invited for further testing. The
score of 56 was chosen as being one SD below the mean
score for individuals with GAD (Molina and Borkovec
1994), and the score of 35 as the mean value previously
found for low worriers (Hayes et al. 2008). The PSWQ was
re-administered at the testing session (within four weeks of
screening) and nine individuals were excluded as they were
no longer in the required range; a further four due to a high
error rate ([33%) on the digit span task (indicating poor
compliance with task); and one who had[10% errors (84%
in no load condition) in the probe discrimination task.
This left 26 high (women n = 22) and 26 low (women
n = 20) worriers, with an average age of 25.6 years
(SD = 5.43).
Materials
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al.
1990)
The PSWQ is a 16-item self-report questionnaire measur-
ing an individual’s trait level of worry. It includes ques-
tions such as ‘‘Many situations make me worry’’, ‘‘Once I
start worrying I cannot stop’’, and ‘‘I have been a worrier
all my life’’. Participants respond using a scale of ‘1 = not
at all typical of me’ to ‘5 = very typical of me’ and scores
therefore can range from 16 to 80, with higher scores
reflecting greater levels of trait worry. The measure has
demonstrated good psychometric properties in clinical and
non-clinical populations (Molina and Borkovec 1994) and
had high levels of internal consistency in the current
sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .98).
Generalised Anxiety Disorder-Questionnaire Version 4
(GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al. 2002)
The GAD-Q-IV is a self-report measure of diagnostic cri-
teria for GAD using DSM-IV criteria, having good pre-
dictive properties for clinical diagnosis (Luterek et al.
2002). In the current study it showed high internal con-
sistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .87).
Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry and Reed
2002)
The ACS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire that
assesses attentional control ability. Example items include:
‘‘My concentration is good even if there is music in the
room around me’’ and ‘‘After being interrupted or dis-
tracted, I can easily shift my attention back to what I was
doing before’’, rated on four-point Likert scales from
‘0 = never’ to ‘3 = always’. It has good psychometric
properties (Muris et al. 2007) and was internally consistent
in the current sample (Cronbach’s alpha of .91). Further-
more, the ACS has been shown to be positively correlated
with objective cognitive measures of control (e.g. Judah
et al. 2014).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Scale (STAI-T;
Spielberger et al. 1970)
The trait scale of the STAI is a self-report scale of trait
anxiety that includes 20 items such as: ‘‘I feel nervous and
restless’’, ‘‘I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think
over my recent concerns and interests’’, rated on four-point
Likert scales from ‘1 = almost never’ to ‘4 = always’.
The STAI has demonstrated good psychometric properties
in previous research (Barnes et al. 2002), and had high
internal consistency in the current sample (Cronbach’s
alpha of .96).
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al. 1996)
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire measur-
ing depressive symptoms. Respondents are required to
circle the statement (out of four) that best describes how
they have been feeling for most of the time over the pre-
vious two weeks; for example, ‘‘I do not feel sad—0’’, ‘‘I
feel sad much of the time—1’’, ‘‘I am sad all the time—2’’,
or ‘‘I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it—3’’. The
BDI-II has shown good validity and reliability in previous
samples (e.g., Storch et al. 2004), and was found to have
high internal consistency in the current sample (Cronbach’s
alpha = .94).
Emotion Rating Scales
Self-reported single item ratings of state worry, anxiety,
depression, and happiness were recorded throughout the
protocol to act as a manipulation check for the worry
induction procedure (see below). Participants provided a
state measure of worry (‘‘How would you rate your worry
in general at this moment?’’; response range = 0–10;
‘10 = extremely worried’) before and after each worry
induction task. In addition, visual analogue mood rating
scales for anxiety, depression, and happiness were given
before and after the worry induction (participants were
instructed to indicate their level of the corresponding
emotion on a 100 mm line, anchored with ‘not at all’ on the
left hand end of the line and ‘extremely’ on the right hand
end of the line).
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Attention Probe Task
Seventy two threat words were selected as representing
typical worry concerns (e.g. ‘‘cancer’’, ‘‘unloved’’) identi-
fied from previous studies, and rated three or above by 20
independent assessors on a five point scale, ranging from
‘0 = not at all threatening’ to ‘5 = extremely threatening’.
Neutral words were then chosen (using the English Lexicon
Project website elexicon.wustl.edu) to match the threat
words in length and frequency of use. Threat-neutral word
pairs were presented in random order within the attention
probe task, with each pair appearing three times in each
experimental condition (i.e. with and without cognitive
load). Word position within pairs was random, within the
constraint that there were 54 trials in which each word type
appeared in the upper or lower positions.
The task itself was carried out in a sound attenuated
room on a laptop computer using the e-Prime program,
with participants seated approximately 45 cm away from
the screen. No-load trials began with a central white fixa-
tion cross (font size 18; on a navy background) for
1000 ms before being replaced by a threat-neutral word
pair (font size 16, Microsoft Sans Serif), with one word
above and one word below fixation, and a visual angle of
4.5 degrees between words. After 500 ms the word pair
was replaced by an arrow (5 mm in length within a
5 mm 9 5 mm white box), randomly in the position pre-
viously occupied by either the upper or lower word. Par-
ticipants identified in which direction the arrow pointed by
pressing marked keys as quickly as possible. Incorrect
responses were signalled by a brief tone after which the
fixation cross re-appeared (immediately or after 2500 ms if
no response was detected) signalling the start of the next
trial. There were 216 trials for each trial block (i.e. with or
without cognitive load). A schematic representation of the
task (with and without cognitive load) is shown in Fig. 1.
In the load condition, sequences of 12 trials began with
the presentation of six to-be-remembered numbers (none
with more than two numerically consecutive digits) for
1500 ms. This was followed by a star for 2500 ms before
the fixation cross appeared (for 1000 ms) signalling the
onset of 12 probed trials, same as for the no-load condition
except for the requirement to remember the digit string.
After completion of 12 trials (cf. Caparos and Linnell
2010), a string of five ‘x’s’ was displayed with one digit
revealed (e.g., ‘‘XXXX7X’’), and participants were
required to indicate by pressing one of two marked keys
whether or not the revealed digit was correct and located as
in the to-be-remembered string. Participants had 3000 ms
to make a response, in keeping with the work of Lavie et al.
(2004), before receiving feedback (either a display of
‘‘correct’’ or ‘‘no response detected’’, or an audible tone to
signal errors). After 1500 ms, followed by a blank screen
for 500 ms, a different set of six digits was presented and
the procedure then continued as above for a total of 18
different number strings.
Previous research has suggested that attention to threat
is more apparent following worry (Williams et al. 2014)
and consequently the attention probe task was preceded by
participants being asked to think of a worry that they had
experienced in the previous week. Questions were used to
elucidate the key aspects of the worry (e.g., ‘‘What would
be bad about that?’’, ‘‘What would that mean for you?’’,
‘‘What worries/concerns you about that?’’) after which
participants were instructed to continue to worry about this
topic for 5 min. This induction was repeated after the first
block of the attention probe task (i.e. after 216 trials) using
the same worry topic to ensure that the effect of the worry
induction was present for the whole task.
Procedure
On arrival participants were given an explanation of the
study and any questions were answered before they signed
a consent form. They then completed all questionnaires
(PSWQ; GAD-Q-IV; ACS; STAI-T; BDI-II) followed by
12 practice trials on the attention probe task with neutral
words only, and a further 18 trials with a cognitive load.
They then continued on to the first worry induction, and
completed the first block of the attention probe task, either
in the cognitive load or no-load condition. The worry task
was then repeated before proceeding to the second block
with the alternative load condition. Throughout the atten-
tion task, participants were offered regular self-governed
breaks when they could restart when ready. Finally, at the
end of the session, they were debriefed, given an expla-
nation of the experimental aims, and reimbursed for their
participation (£15, equivalent to $23).
Results
Group Characteristics
Group characteristics were compared using independent
sample t-tests, and means are shown in Table 1. Worriers
were younger than low worriers (high worriers
mean = 23.23, SD = 4.78, low worriers mean = 28,
SD = 5.07; t (50) = 3.49, p = .001, d = 0.97), but Fish-
er’s exact test revealed no differences between groups in
ethnicity (Caucasian vs. Black and Minority Ethnic
Groups; p = .248). All participants were either in
employment (67%) or in full-time education (33%), and
71% had completed a higher education course.
Nine participants (35%) in the high worrier group and
none in the low group met criteria for GAD on the GAD-Q-
Cogn Ther Res
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IV. As expected, the groups differed on all other measures
of psychopathology, with high worriers reporting higher
scores than low worriers on the PSWQ, t (50) = 27.18,
p\ .001, d = 7.54, STAI-T, t (50) = 11.01, p\ .001,
d = 3.05, and BDI-II, t (31.1) = 6.49, p\ .001, d = 1.8.
In contrast, low worriers had higher scores on the ACS,
t (50) = -5.58, p\ .001, d = 1.55, indicating better
reported attentional control.
Emotion Ratings
Ratings of state worry across the whole sample signifi-
cantly increased between pre- and post-worry inductions
(Pre-worry M = 4.24, SD = 2.41; Post-worry M = 5.05,
SD = .29). An additional paired t test comparing the
change scores (for state worry) between pre- and post-in-
duction after the first versus second induction was also
Fig. 1 Example of probe discrimination task threat trial under no-load (a) and a probe discrimination task threat trial under cognitive load (b)
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performed. The results indicated that there was no signif-
icant difference between the two induction occasions in
change of worry [t(51) = -.86, sig = .39,
M change1 = .69, SD = 1.42; M change2 = .92,
SD = 1.40].
As expected, an independent samples t test revealed that
high worriers reported a significantly greater level of state
worry than low worriers after the worry inductions
[t(50) = 7.62, p\ .001; High M = 7.00, SD = 1.41; Low
M = 3.10, SD = 2.20]. However, a subsequent 2 (worry
change 1 vs. worry change 2) 9 2 (high vs. low worry)
mixed ANOVA revealed that there were no significant
effects of group [F(1,50) = 1.48, p = .23] and no signifi-
cant group 9 time interactions [F(1,50) = 1.70, p = .20],
indicating that the worry induction induced similar relative
increases in worry in both low and high worriers. Addi-
tional emotion rating scales’ results can be seen in the
footnote below.1
Attention Probe Task
Prior to extracting median RTs, trials with errors (1.9%), or
with response latencies\200 or[2000 ms (0.12%) were
excluded, as per previous research (Bradley et al. 1999).
An ANOVA of trial errors, with two within-participant
factors (word valence: threat vs. neutral; condition: cog-
nitive load vs. no-load) and one between-participant factor
(group: high worriers vs. low worriers) revealed no main
effects of valence, F(1,50) = 1.42, p = .239, g2p ¼ :03,
load condition, F(1,50) = 1.53, p = .222, g2p ¼ :03, or
group, F(1,50) = 1.12, p = .294, g2p ¼ :02).
For the primary analysis of latencies, a threat bias index
was calculated (cf. Bradley et al. 1999; MacLeod and
Mathews 1988; MacLeod et al. 2007). This index was
calculated by subtracting the median RTs on threat trials
(i.e., when the probe replaced a threat word) from the
median RTs on neutral trials (i.e., when the probe replaced
a neutral word) for each participant, so that positive values
represent attention bias towards and negative values away
from threat. The mean RTs and threat bias indices for high
and low worriers can be seen in Table 2. A mixed-design
ANOVA was performed on this data with group (high vs.
low worriers) as the between-participant factor and
Table 1 Group characteristics and psychopathology measures
High worriers (n = 26) Low worriers (n = 26)
Gender
(m/f)
4/22 6/20
Age 23.23 (4.78)a 28 (5.07)a
Ethnicity White British = 17; Any other White background = 3; Mixed—
White and Black Caribbean = 1; Mixed—White and Black
African = 1; Mixed—White and Asian = 2; Indian = 1;
Caribbean = 1
White British = 16; White Irish = 3; Any other White
background = 5; Mixed—Any other mixed background = 1;
African = 1
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
PSWQ 64.15 (4.61) 27.23 (5.17)
STAI-T 52.77 (6.73) 30.69 (7.70)
BDI-II 15.12 (9.18) 2.73 (3.23)
ACS 46.35 (7.28) 59.42 (9.49)
m/f male/female, PSWQ Penn State worry Questionnaire, STAI-T State Trait Anxiety Inventory—Trait Scale, BDI-II Beck Depression Inventory-
II, ACS Attentional Control Scale
a Mean (SD)
1 Separate 2 9 2 9 2 mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVAs
were run for each mood rating (anxious, depressed, and happy). The
anxiety ratings reported a significant main effect of group, with high
worriers being more anxious than low worriers overall
[F(1,50) = 59.85, p\ .001; High M = 58.29, SD = 16.43; Low
M = 19.38, SD = 19.69]; and a main effect of time, demonstrating a
significant increase in anxiety between before worry inductions and
after worry inductions [F(1,50) = 14.88, p\ .001; Pre M = 35.79,
SD = 25.48; Post M = 41.88, SD = 28.89]. There were no signif-
icant two-way or three-way interactions. A similar opposite pattern of
results occurred for the happiness ratings as expected.
Depression ratings reported a significant main effect of group, with
high worriers being significantly more depressed than low worriers
overall [F(1,50) = 29.65, p\ .001; High M = 33.54, SD = 18.20;
Low M = 9.84, SD = 12.70]; and a main effect of time, demon-
strating a significant increase in depression ratings between before
Footnote 1 continued
worry inductions and after worry inductions [F(1,50) = 49.49,
p\ .001; Pre M = 17.91, SD = 17.88; Post M = 25.46,
SD = 22.18]. There was also a significant group x time interaction
[F(1,50) = 17.60, p\ .001], with high worriers reporting a greater
increase in depression ratings pre- to post-worry induction (M differ-
ence = 12.2) than low worriers (M difference = 2.9). There were no
other significant two-way or three-way interactions.
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condition (cognitive load vs. no-load) as the within-par-
ticipant factor. There was a main effect of group, F(1,
50) = 4.24, p = .045, g2p ¼ :08 [high worriers
mean = 4.01 (12.52) vs. low worriers mean = -2.56
(10.41)]. However, there was no significant main effect of
condition (cognitive load vs. no-load; F(1, 50) = .10,
p = .749, g2p ¼ :002) nor a condition 9 group interaction,
F(1, 50) = .01, p = .913, g2p\:001. Consequently, these
results failed to provide any evidence that cognitive load
increased or decreased attentional bias to threat, since the
pre-emption of cognitive control resources by load failed to
show significant effects in either direction.
To investigate the possible role of self-reported atten-
tional control ability (cf. Derryberry and Reed 2002), a
stepwise regression analysis was conducted with threat bias
index as the dependent variable, and group or attention
control score (ACS) as predictors. Entering group in the
first step confirmed the previous finding that threat bias
index was predicted by high versus low worry, R2 = .078,
F(50) = 4.24, p\ .05. Adding ACS scores in the second
step did not significantly add to predictive variance, R2
change = .012, F(49) = 0.67, n.s.; nor did adding the
group by ACS interaction in step three, R2 change = .001,
F(48) = .053, n.s. These results indicate that, although
ACS scores were signicantly lower in high than in low
worry groups, they did not predict threat bias, either
overall, or differentially within worry groups. Consistent
with the findings of no significant effects due to cognitive
load, these results suggest that variations in self-reported
attentional control do not significantly influence attentional
bias to threat, at least at the 500 ms stimulus onset asyn-
chony (SOA) used here.
Discussion
The current study was designed to investigate attentional
bias to threat in high worriers, and specifically whether this
bias is modified by top-down control, or is relatively auto-
matic. As expected, we found that high worriers showed
more evidence of attention to threat cues than did a com-
parison group of low worriers. Although this effect was
small, it confirmed a similar effect previously observed in
high worriers using the same task (Williams et al. 2014),
demonstrating its reliability. We also found that high wor-
riers reported less attentional control ability than low wor-
riers on a self-report questionnaire (ACS) that has
previously been found to correlate with objective measures
of control (Judah et al. 2014). This result is consistent with
other experimental findings that high worriers are relatively
impaired in working memory tasks, particularly when
worrying (e.g. Hayes et al. 2008). However, level of
reported control was not predictive of attention to threat,
suggesting that reduced ability to control attention does not
play an important causal role in attentional bias. Of most
importance for present purposes, imposition of an additional
cognitive load failed to significantly decrease the extent of
biased attention to threat (numerically, bias was non-sig-
nificantly larger under load). These findings strongly sug-
gest that attention to threat in high worriers is relatively
automatic, at least in the sense that voluntary control efforts
are either lacking, or if deployed have no observable impact.
Of course, absence of evidence for control is not nec-
essarily evidence of its absence, so that we cannot conclude
that attentional bias to threat can never be influenced by
top-down control. The SOA of 500 ms was adopted partly
because previous evidence has suggested that control over
attention can occur within this interval, at least in those
with high ACS scores (e.g. Derryberry and Reed 2002), but
it may be that use of longer intervals would have revealed
clearer evidence of interference with control. Also, differ-
ent degrees or types of cognitive manipulations may block
attentional bias more effectively; for example by matching
working memory load to each individual’s capacity, or
using a perceptual rather than conceptual load cf.; Lavie
et al. 2004; Pessoa et al. 2002).
Consequently, one limitation of the present study is that
we cannot be certain that the load imposed took up suffi-
cient cognitive resources to prevent any control efforts. The
lack of a main effect of load on overall response latencies
could be interpreted as support for this possibility. How-
ever, the relatively automatic nature of this task per se (e.g.
responding to a leftwards arrow by pressing a left hand
key) presumably demands very little resources compared
with those required to control selective attention (e.g.
Table 2 Probe discrimination task mean (SD) latencies and threat bias indices
High worriers (n = 26) Low worriers (n = 26)
No-load Cognitive load Total No-load Cognitive load Total
Mean RT 556.49 (46.58) 568.39 (51.50) 562.44 (46.86) 567.54 (55.78) 569.58 (64.30) 568.56 (58.11)
TBI 3.34 (20.49) 4.69 (14.67) 4.01 (12.52) -2.89 (14.79) -2.23 (13.73) -2.56 (10.41)
RT reaction time, TBI threat bias index
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specifically to threat cues). Furthermore, the load used here
is typical of those found in many previous studies to take
up significant attentional control resources (e.g. Lavie et al.
2004).
Nonetheless, effective voluntary control presumably
depends on the intention to attend or avoid as well as
having sufficient cognitive resources to succeed in doing
so. The lack of any clear influence of cognitive load could
thus reflect lack of intent or motivation to control attention
to threat cues, rather than necessarily being due to impaired
control ability. Either way, the lack of significant effects on
bias due either to load or reported level of attentional
control provides evidence that high worriers do not typi-
cally exert effective control over the capture of attention by
threat content, at least within a relatively early time frame.
In the model proposed by Hirsch and Mathews (2012),
early attention to intrusive threatening thoughts acts as a
trigger for worry episodes, so that failure to control
attention to threat cues can contribute to pathological
worry.
Whether or not high worriers can control their atten-
tional biases has implications for the treatment of
pathological worry. If they can, but do not implement the
cognitive effort required to do so, then therapy should be
directed at increasing that effort; for example, by coun-
tering beliefs that may underlie lack of effort, such as
that worry is helpful or cannot be prevented (Wells
1995). If, in contrast, high worriers have impaired control
of attentional biases then the use of training methods to
enhance control resources would be indicated although
research so far has shown rather mixed effectiveness
(e.g., Harrison et al. 2013). Alternatively, the present
results could imply that attention to threat is a relatively
automatic process, and one that is difficult to oppose by
voluntary efforts alone. If so, this would support alter-
native approaches bypassing the need for effortful control
over attention to threat, for example by increasing the
availability of competing information via repeated prac-
tice in attending to benign cues or meanings (Hayes
et al. 2010; cognitive bias modification, see Hertel and
Mathews 2011).
The current study’s findings may have implications for
the development of treatments for people with high levels
of worry. However, it would be important to replicate the
present study in a clinical sample (e.g. generalised anxiety
disorder; GAD) in order to test whether similar results
emerge before offering any clinical conclusions. If so,
various avenues for treatment could be explored in future
research, testing possible explanations for the current
findings. First, the additional use of longer SOAs would
reveal if control resources are deployed at greater intervals
after threat occurrence than those sampled here, and whe-
ther this can reduce longer term attentional bias effects. If
so, this would support further work investigating whether
control efforts can be made more effective; for example, by
practice in deploying them as soon as possible after threat
detection. Alternatively, varying the type of cognitive load
or type of control measures would test if perceptual load is
more effective in blocking bias assessed using visually
presented threat cues (cf. Lavie et al. 2004; Pessoa et al.
2002).
However, worry involves attention to internal events
such as negative intrusive thoughts so that a more critical
test might involve testing the extent to which load blocks
attention to negative thoughts (as opposed to visual atten-
tion to external cues). Previous research findings provide
tentative evidence that intrusive negative thoughts can be
reduced by substituting positive thoughts (Hirsch et al.
2015), although it remains unclear whether this effect is
due to controlled or automatic processes. One approach to
addressing this issue would be to contrast instructed (i.e.
controlled) use of thought substitution with repeated
practice aimed at increasing automatic access to alternative
non-worry content.
In conclusion, we confirmed that high worriers are more
likely to attend threat cues than low worriers, and further
established that this bias persisted regardless of additional
cognitive load, or reported attentional control ability. The
latter findings provide no support for the hypothesis that
biased attention to threat is dependent on controlled effort,
either directed towards (vigilance) or away from threat
cues (avoidance). Rather, the results are consistent with the
possibility that biased attention towards threat cues in high
worriers operates without deliberate effort and thus may be
at least partially automatic. However, future research is
required to test whether these findings depend on type of
load or exposure duration: for example, more evidence of
intentional efforts to avoid, or to maintain attention to
threats, may emerge at longer exposure durations when
controlled processes become more dominant. Nonetheless,
the present results do provide support for the use of treat-
ment approaches designed to modify early and relatively
automatic attention processes, which may contribute to the
onset of uncontrollable worry episodes (Hirsch and Math-
ews 2012).
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